July, 2026 | Safe Communities Portugal

Government declares state of alert across the entire mainland territory.

Extended for 10 districts from 00.00 hrs 7th July until 23.59 hrs Thursday 9th July 2026 for the following 10 districts ;Vila Real, Bragança, Guarda, Viseu, Castelo Branco, Santarém, Portalegre, Évora, Beja and Faro.

For the remaining 8 districts it terminates 23.59 hrs 6th July

• The declaration of a state of alert comprises a set of exceptional measures, justified by the increased risk of rural fires.

• The state of alert comes into effect at 00:00 on Friday, July 3rd, and extends until 23:59 on Monday, July 6th.

Given the weather forecast for the coming days, which indicates a significant increase in the risk of wildfires, the Government, through the Ministers of National Defence, Infrastructure and Housing, Internal Administration, Health, Labour, Solidarity and Social Security, Environment and Energy, Culture, Youth and Sport, and Agriculture and Sea, has declared a state of alert across the entire mainland territory.

The state of alert will be in effect from 00:00 on Friday, July 3rd, until 23:59 on Monday, July 6th.

This declaration stems from the raising of the special alert level of the Integrated System of Civil Protection and Relief Operations (SIOPS) and the need to adopt preventive and special response measures to the fire risk, as predicted by the Portuguese Institute of the Sea and the Atmosphere (IPMA), across a large part of the mainland territory.

Within the framework of the declaration of a state of alert, as foreseen in the Basic Law on Civil Protection, the following exceptional measures will be implemented:

• Prohibition of access, circulation and stay within the forest areas previously defined in the Municipal Plans for Forest Fire Defense, as well as on forest roads, rural roads and other routes that cross them;

• Prohibition of controlled burns and burning of leftover vegetation, as well as the suspension of any authorizations that have been issued;

• Prohibition of carrying out work in forest areas using any type of machinery, except for those associated with rural fire fighting;

• Prohibition of carrying out work in other rural areas using brush cutters with metal blades or discs, brush cutters, shredders and machines with blades or front shovels;

• Prohibition of the use of fireworks or other pyrotechnic devices, regardless of their form of combustion, as well as the suspension of any authorizations that have been issued;

• Prohibition of launching balloons with lit wicks, as well as the suspension of any authorizations that have been issued.

The ban does not cover:

• Work associated with feeding and watering animals, phytosanitary or fertilization treatments, irrigation, pruning, harvesting and transporting agricultural crops, provided that these are essential and cannot be postponed and are carried out in irrigated areas or areas devoid of forests, woods or flammable materials, and from which there is no risk of ignition;

• Cork extraction by manual methods and honey extraction (harvesting), provided that it is carried out without resorting to fumigation methods obtained by incandescent material or temperature generator;

• Civil construction work, provided that it cannot be postponed and that appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the risk of rural fires;

• Harvesting of agricultural crops using machinery, namely combine harvesters, and carrying out forestry operations involving cutting, skidding and transport, between sunset and 11:00 am, provided that measures to mitigate the risk of rural fires are adopted and their execution is communicated to the territorially competent Municipal Civil Protection Service.

The declaration of a state of alert implies:

• The elevation of the level of readiness and operational response by the National Republican Guard (GNR) and the Public Security Police (PSP), with reinforcement of resources for surveillance operations, inspections, patrols to deter dangerous behaviors, and general support for protection and rescue operations that may be triggered, considering for this purpose the interruption of vacation leave and the suspension of days off and rest periods;

• The increase in the level of readiness and mobilization of emergency medical, public health, and social support teams by the competent entities in the areas of health and social security;

• The permanent mobilization of forest firefighting teams assigned to the firefighting force;

• The permanent mobilization of the National Corps of Forest Agents and Nature Wardens who are part of the fire prevention and fighting force, by the Institute for Nature Conservation and Forests (ICNF);

• Increasing the readiness level of response teams from entities with a special duty of cooperation in the areas of communications (fixed and mobile network operators) and energy (transport and distribution);

• The carrying out by the GNR (National Republican Guard) of patrolling (surveillance) and aerial inspection actions using Armed Forces resources, in districts under a state of special alert, focusing on locations identified as having a very high and maximum risk of fire;

• The exemption from service or justification of absences for workers, from the public or private sector, who cumulatively perform the functions of volunteer firefighters, except those who perform functions in the Armed Forces, Security Forces and the National Emergency and Civil Protection Authority (ANEPC), as well as in public health care services in emergency situations, namely pre-hospital emergency technicians and nurses from the National Institute of Medical Emergency (INEM);

The National Emergency and Civil Protection Authority (ANEPC) will issue warnings to the population about the risk of rural fires.

The Armed Forces will make aerial resources available to operate, if necessary and depending on available resources, in locations determined by that Authority.

In accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article 14 of the Basic Law on Civil Protection, the declaration of a state of alert determines:

a) Activating the territorially competent institutional coordination structures, which ensure the coordination of all agents, entities, and institutions involved in protection and rescue operations;

b) Activating the territorially competent political coordination structures, which assess the need to activate the civil protection emergency plan at the respective territorial level;

c) A special obligation of collaboration from the media, particularly radio and television, as well as mobile telecommunications operators, with the coordination structures referred to in the previous points, aiming at disseminating relevant information regarding the situation.

Greenpeace Report on Wildfires in Portugal

80 years of Data shows that the country must change

This document is a Greenpeace report analyzing the increasing wildfire risk, historical trends, management challenges, and policy recommendations for Portugal.

Increasing Wildfire Risk in Portugal

Portugal faces a rising wildfire threat driven by climate change, land abandonment, urban expansion, and landscape vulnerabilities.

Over 80 years of data show large fires are not limited to summer months.
Wildfire risk has increased since 1943, with annual fires rising from a few hundred to over 30,000 in the early 2000s.
Burned area increased from a few thousand hectares before 1970 to around 100,000 hectares afterward; record year 2017 with 540 kha burned.
Rural abandonment and urban encroachment have reduced land management and increased wildland-urban interface.
Fatalities among civilians have surpassed those of operational firefighters since 2017.

Evolution of Wildfire Management Systems

Portugal has improved its firefighting capacity and coordination but still faces structural vulnerabilities.

Firefighters increased from 15k (1950) to 42k (1990), then decreased to 30k; professional firefighters rose from 8k (2013) to 13.5k (2023).
Professional firefighters now represent 41.2% of total firefighting personnel.
Human resources increased by 45% since 2017, with better coordination, equipment, and training.
Initial attack success rate improved from 50% (1980) to 91% (2006), then slightly declined to 85% due to severity and fewer fires.
Portugal is better equipped but remains highly exposed to extreme wildfires and at-risk populations.

Significance of Large and Extreme Wildfires

Large fires are more frequent, faster, and harder to control, with recent years showing record-breaking events.

Fires over 100 hectares are considered large; in Europe, over 500 hectares.
Large wildfires are increasingly intense, with outliers in 2003, 2005, 2017, and 2025.
The five largest fires annually have increased from an average of 0.95 kha (1980) to 9.73 kha (2025).
Major fires in 2017, 2022, 2024, and 2025 mostly occurred in Central and North Portugal.
The Pedrógão Grande fire (2017) caused 66 deaths, burned 30.4 kha, and was caused by electrical lines.
The largest fire in 2025 burned 68.5 kha, with five fatalities, triggered by heat waves.
Extreme Wildfire Events (EWEs) are characterized by erratic behavior, rapid spread, and overwhelming control efforts.

Impact of Climate and Land Use Changes

Climate change and land abandonment have intensified wildfire severity and spread.

Portugal’s climate is influenced by Atlantic and Mediterranean, with recent tropical storms and heatwaves increasing fire risk.
Fuel-heavy landscapes, especially unmanaged eucalyptus, pine, and shrublands, contribute to severe fires.
Fuel continuity and land abandonment are more decisive than species alone.
Climate change has intensified existing vulnerabilities rather than creating new risks.
Eucalyptus plantations are controversial; they can contribute to severe fires when poorly managed.
Landscape transformation occurs slowly, with rural depopulation and economic decline worsening vulnerabilities.

Governance and Policy Responses

Portugal’s wildfire governance has shifted from suppression-focused to more integrated, but challenges remain.

Post-2003/2005, recognition grew that landscape and structural issues drive fires.
After 2017, policies expanded to include rural fire management, land use, and prevention.
Agencies like AGIF, PNGIFR, and SGIFR were created, with ongoing legislative and organizational reforms.
Landscape transformation and climate adaptation are key challenges.
Cross-border cooperation with Spain is increasing but faces institutional differences.
Emphasis on community preparedness, territorial adaptation, and coexistence with fire is rising.
Political focus remains on immediate suppression, with prevention efforts slower to implement.
Wildfire governance depends on long-term demographic, economic, and climatic trends.

Conclusions and Future Challenges

Portugal remains highly vulnerable despite improvements; large fires are increasing, and climate change exacerbates risks.

Over decades, Portugal has been among Europe’s most affected by wildfires.
Large fires and burned areas have increased since 2000, with notable years in 2003, 2005, 2017, and 2025.
Land fragmentation, rural abandonment, and climate change are key factors.
Fire suppression has improved, but structural prevention remains insufficient.
The pace of climate change may outpace efforts to modify landscapes and prepare communities.
Without stronger prevention, firefighting will continue to arrive too late, risking more fatalities and damage.
Greenpeace demands include ambitious climate action, strategic landscape management, private sector engagement, inclusive governance, rural economic revitalization, and cross-border cooperation.

Summary in English:

Full report in English